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Abstract: An imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two
players have the same set of pure strategies and the goal of the second player is to choose
the same pure strategy as the first player. Gale et al. (1950) gave a way of passing from a
given two person game to a symmetric game whose symmetric Nash equilibria are in one-
to-one correspondence with the Nash equilibria of the given game. We give a way of passing
from a given symmetric two person game to an imitation game whose Nash equilibria are
in one-to-one correspondence with the symmetric Nash equilibria of the given symmetric
game. Lemke (1965) portrayed the Lemke-Howson algorithm as a special case of the Lemke
paths algorithm. Using imitation games, we show how Lemke paths may be obtained by
projecting Lemke-Howson paths.
Keywords: Computational economics, Symmetric games, Nash equilibrium, Computa-
tional complexity, Two person games, 2-Nash, PPAD, Imitation games, Lemke-Howson
algorithm, Lemke paths algorithm.
1 Introduction
An imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players
have the “same” sets of pure strategies. That is, they have the same number of pure
strategies, and there is a given bijection between the two sets of pure strategies that
identifies each pure strategy of the first player with a particular pure strategy of
the second player. The first player is called the mover ; she can have any payoff
matrix. The second player, who is called the imitator, receives a payoff of 1 if she
∗School of Economics, University of Queensland, Level 6, Colin Clark Building, St Lucia, QLD
4072 Australia.
†School of Economics, University of Queensland, Level 6, Colin Clark Building, St Lucia, QLD
4072 Australia.
1
2plays “the same” pure strategy as the mover, and otherwise her payoff is 0, so her
payoff matrix is the identity matrix. Imitation games are evidently a special, and
seemingly rather simple, type of two person game.
It turns out that from the point of view of computation, imitation games, and
their Nash equilibria, are as complex as general two person games and their Nash
equilibria. This paper shows how, in two different settings, observations along these
lines complete a circle of ideas, with the result that phenomena that had for many
years seemed to be distinct are actually superficially different manifestations of a
single mathematical structure. In the remainder of the introduction we give very
brief and informal descriptions of our findings.
A general two person game is given by a pair (A,B) of m × n payoff matrices.
Gale et al. (1950) showed that if all the entries of A and B are positive and
C :=
[
0 A
BT 0
]
,
then the symmetric equilibria of the two person game (C,CT ) are in one-to-one
correspondence with the Nash equilibria of the given game. The Nash equilibria of
(A,B) are unaffected by the addition of a constant to all the entries of A and B,
so this gives a sense (described precisely in Section 3) in which any computational
problem related to the Nash equilibria of two person games is “easier” than the
corresponding problem for symmetric equilibria of symmetric games: given an algo-
rithm A for the corresponding problem, there is an algorithm for the given problem
consisting of adding a sufficiently large constant to all entries of A and B, forming
C as above, and then applying A to (C,CT ).
However, as we will see in more detail shortly, for any square matrix C the
symmetric equilibria of (C,CT ) are in natural one-to-one correspondence with the
Nash equilibria of the imitation game (C, I). Given an algorithm B for the given
problem related to Nash equilibrium, there is an algorithm for the corresponding
problem related to symmetric equilibria of symmetric games consisting of applying
B to (C, I).
Lemke and Howson (1964) gave a pivoting algorithm for computing a Nash equi-
librium of (A,B) that came to be known as the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Gener-
alizing slightly, it will be helpful to think of the input as consisting of a pair (A,B)
together with pair (p, q) whose components are an m-vector and an n-vector. Sub-
3sequently Lemke (1965) described a family of computational procedures that take
as input a pair (C, r) consisting of an p × p matrix C and an p-vector r. This
procedure, which came to be known as the Lemke paths algorithm, includes the
Lemke-Howson algorithm as the special case that arises when p = m+ n and C is
derived from (A,B) as above. For each integer k ≥ 1 let ek := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rk. Our
contribution here is to show that the Lemke paths algorithm can by obtained by
applying the Lemke-Howson algorithm to (C, I) and (r, ep) ∈ R2p.
This observation has an interesting application to the theory of the worst case
running times of these algorithms. Both for Lemke-Howson and Lemke paths,
there are multiple possible starting points, so that in order to show an exponential
worst case running time it is necessary to find a sequence of examples in which
the minimum—over all possible starting points—running time grows exponentially.
Morris (1994) gave a sequence of pairs (Cp, e
p) of this sort for the Lemke paths
algorithm. Elaborating on his methods, Savani and von Stengel (2006) construct a
sequence of examples of games for which the worst case running time of the Lemke-
Howson algorithm grows exponentially. As they mention (citing an earlier version
of this work) one can also obtain such a sequence directly from Morris’ examples,
by applying the Lemke-Howson algorithm to the two person game (Cp, I).
2 Symmetric Games and Linear Complementarity Problems
For each integer k ≥ 1 let ∆k be the standard unit simplex in Rk, i.e., the set of
vectors whose components are nonnegative and sum to one. A Nash equilibrium of
the game (A,B) is a pair (σ, τ) ∈ ∆m×∆n such that σTAτ ≥ σ˜TAτ for all σ˜ ∈ ∆m
and σTBτ ≥ σTBτ˜ for all τ˜ ∈ ∆n. A symmetric game is a game (C,CT ) where C
is a square matrix, and ρ ∈ Rm is a symmetric equilibrium of (C,CT ) if (ρ, ρ) is a
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1 (Gale et al. (1950)). Suppose A and B are m×n matrices whose
entries are all positive, and let
C :=
[
0 A
BT 0
]
.
For ρ ∈ ∆m+n the following are equivalent:
4(a) ρ is a symmetric equilibrium of (C,CT );
(b) there are σ ∈ ∆m, τ ∈ ∆n, and 0 < α < 1 such that:
(i) ρ = ((1− α)σ, ατ),
(ii) (σ, τ) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B), and
(iii) (1− α)σTAτ = ασTBτ .
Proof. First suppose that ρ is a symmetric equilibrium of (C,CT ). We have ρ =
((1 − α)σ, ατ) for some σ ∈ ∆m, τ ∈ ∆n, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In view of the identity
(σ, 0)TC(σ, 0) = 0 = (0, τ)TC(0, τ) and the fact that entries of B and C are all
positive, it cannot be the case that α = 0 or α = 1. Because α < 1, in the game
(B,C) the strategy σ is a best response for agent 1 to τ , and similarly τ is a best
response for agent 2 to σ. In addition, (σ, 0) and (0, τ) are both best responses to
ρ, so (1− α)σTBτ = ασTCτ .
Now suppose that (b) holds. It is easily verified that (σ, 0) and (0, τ) are best
responses to ρ := ((1−α)σ, ατ) in (C,CT ), so any convex combination of (σ, 0) and
(0, τ), such as ρ, is also a best response to ρ.
An imitation game is a game (C, I) in which C is a square matrix and I is
the identity matrix. Whenever g and h are integers with g ≤ h we let [g, h] :=
{g, . . . , h}. For any integer k ≥ 1 the support of µ ∈ ∆k is
suppµ := { i ∈ [1, k] : µi > 0 }.
Let p be the number of rows and columns of C. An I-equilibrium of an imitation
game (C, I) is a mixed strategy ρ ∈ ∆p for the imitator such that
suppρ ⊂ argmax
i∈I
(Cρ)i.
Proposition 2.2. A mixed strategy ρ ∈ ∆p is an I-equilibrium of (C, I) if and only
if there is an ι ∈ ∆p such that (ι, ρ) is a Nash equilibrium of (C, I).
Proof. If (ι, ρ) is a Nash equilibrium of (C, I), then the support of ρ is contained in
the support of ι, because ρ is a best response to ι for the imitator, and the support
of ι is contained argmaxi∈I (Cρ)i, because ι is a best response to ρ for the mover.
Thus, the support of ρ is contained in argmaxi∈I (Cρ)i.
5Now suppose ρ is an I-equilibrium of (C, I). Because the set of best responses
to ρ contains the support of ρ, we may choose an ι ∈ ∆p that assigns all probability
to best responses to ρ (so ι is a best response to ρ) and maximal probability to
elements of the support of ρ (so ρ is a best response to ι).
In addition to symmetric equilibria of symmetric games, I-equilibria of imitation
games, and Nash equilibria of imitation games, a fourth formulation of the problem
will be important in what follows. A linear complementarity problem (LCP) is a
problem of the form
w + Cz ≤ r, z ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, 〈z,w〉 = 0
where the p× p matrix C and the vector r ∈ Rp are given and vectors z,w ∈ Rp are
sought. The LCP is said to be monotone if all the entries of C are positive. The
extensive literature on the linear complementarity problem is surveyed in Murty
(1988) and Cottle et al. (1992).
Proposition 2.3. For an p × p matrix C with positive entries and ρ ∈ ∆p the fol-
lowing are equivalent:
(a) ρ is a symmetric equilibrium of (C,CT );
(b) ρ is an I-equilibrium of (C, I);
(c) there is ι ∈ ∆m such that (ι, ρ) is a Nash equilibrium of (C, I);
(d) ρ := z/
∑p
i=1 zi where (w, z) with z 6= 0 is a solution of the LCP
w +Cz ≤ ep, z ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, 〈z,w〉 = 0.
Proof. The equivalence of (a) and (b) is immediate. The equivalence of (b) and (c)
is Proposition 2.2. To complete the proof we show that (b) and (d) are equivalent. If
(w, z) is a solution of the LCP with z 6= 0, then ρ := z/
∑m
i=1 zi is an I-equilibrium
of the imitation game (C, I), because the complementarity condition 〈z,w〉 = 0
means precisely that each pure strategy for the first agent is either unused (that is,
ρi = 0) or gives the maximal expected payoff. Conversely, if ρ is an I-equilibrium,
we can obtain a solution of the LCP by setting z := αρ where α > 0 is chosen to
make the smallest component of w := ep − Cz zero.
6The route by which two person games have traditionally been understood to
give rise to linear complementarity problems is as follows. Adding a constant to all
entries of either of the matrices A and B does not change the set of Nash equilibria
of a game (A,B), and in this sense requiring all of their entries to be positive is
without loss of generality. Let A and B be m×n matrices with positive entries, let
p := m+ n, and for any natural number k let ek := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rk. Consider the
LCP [
u
v
]
+
[
0 A
BT 0
][
x
y
]
=
[
em
en
]
, u, v, x, y ≥ 0, u · x = 0, v · y = 0.
There is a “trivial” solution (u, v, x, y) = (em, en, 0, 0). Any other solution neces-
sarily has both x 6= 0 and y 6= 0, and σ := x/
∑
xi and τ := y/
∑
yj constitute a
Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if (σ, τ) is a Nash equilibrium, and α and β are the
smallest positive numbers such that all components of A(βτ) and BT (ασ) are not
greater than 1, then u := em−Ay, v := en−BTx, x := ασ, and y := βτ constitute
a solution to the LCP above.
As Proposition 2.3 explains, the notion of an I-equilibrium of an imitation game
provides a distinct route by which games lead to LCP’s.
3 Computation
In this section we recall certain basic concepts of computer science and relate them
to the results above. A computational problem is a correspondence from a space
of allowed inputs to a space of allowed outputs, both of which are subsets of the
space of finite bit strings. An algorithm for such a problem is a Turing machine
that converts any element of the space of inputs into one of its allowed outputs. An
algorithm is polynomial time if its running time is bounded above by a polynomial
function of the size of the input. A computational problem is polynomial if it has a
polynomial time algorithm.
A computational problem is a decision problem if its space of outputs is {0, 1} =
{NO,YES} and for each input there is only one allowed output. The class of
polynomial decision problems is denoted by P. A decision problem is in NP if,
whenever the desired output is YES, there is a “witness” and a polynomial time
procedure taking the problem and the witness as inputs that verifies that the desired
7output is YES. For example, the problem of determining whether a graph has a k-
clique is in NP because any k-clique is a suitable witness. Clearly P ⊂ NP, and it
is thought to be extremely likely that the containment is strict, but whether this is
actually the case is one of the most prominent open problems in mathematics.
Given two computational problems P and Q, a reduction from Q to P is a pair
of maps, one of which takes an input x for Q to an input r(x) for P , and the other
of which takes an output y of P to an output s(y) of Q, such that s transforms any
of the desired outputs of P for r(x) to one of the desired outputs of Q for x. The
reduction is a polynomial time reduction1 if the size of the output of P for r(x) is
bounded by a polynomial function of the size of x and there are polynomial time
algorithms that compute the values of r and s.
Suppose C is a class of computational problems and P ∈ C. We say that P is
C-complete if every problem in C has a polynomial time reduction to P . Gilboa
and Zemel (1989) show that many decision problems related to Nash equilibria
of two person games (Is there more than one Nash equilibrium?, Is there a Nash
equilibrium assigning positive probability to a certain pure strategy?, etc.) are NP-
complete. Recently several new proofs (Conitzer and Sandholm (2003); Blum and
Toth (2004); Codenotti and Sˇtefanovicˇ (2005)) of these results have been given,
including one (McLennan and Tourky (2005)) using imitation games.
The computational problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a finite two person
normal form game (A,B) is called 2-Nash. Papadimitriou (2001) has described the
problem of determining whether 2-Nash has a polynomial time algorithm as (along
with factoring) “the most important concrete open question on the boundary of P.”
The most important reason for this is the fact that 2-Nash is a fixed point problem
that is seemingly a small step beyond linear programming, which is in P.
Hirsch et al. (1989) studied a discrete version of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
that is based on function evaluation. Specifically, one is given an “oracle” or “black
box” that computes the value of a function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n, and the goal is to
find a point x satisfying ‖f(x)−x‖ ≤ 2−p. They show that if n ≥ 3 and x 7→ f(x)−x
is known to be Lipschitzian with Lipschitz constant L, then any algorithm must, in
the worst case, evaluate the function at at least (c(2p − 10)L)n−2 points, where c
is a positive constant. Specifically, they construct a collection of example functions
such that, when np is sufficiently large, any smaller number of function evaluations
1Other conditions on the reduction can also be considered (Papadimitriou, 1994a, Section 8.1).
8will necessarily fail to distinguish between two examples that have different fixed
points.
The fixed point problems that arise in practice typically come from applications
that endow them with additional structure. In order to systematically study the
possibility that such structure might allow more efficient computation, Papadim-
itriou (1994b) introduced the computational class PPAD. The search space of a
problem in PPAD is the set {0, 1}r of bitstrings of length r for some natural num-
ber r. An element of PPAD has two inputs. The first is a Turing machine M,
whose worst case running time is bounded by a polynomial function of r, with the
following properties. Given an input from the search space, M outputs a “prede-
cessor” in {0, 1}r (or an indication that the bitstring is a source) and a “successor”
in {0, 1}r (or an indication that the bitstring is a sink). The input cannot coincide
with either the predecessor or the successor, it is the successor of its predecessor
when it is not a source, and it is the predecessor of its successor when it is not a
sink. Thus the Turing machine computes a directed graph whose vertices are the
bitstrings and whose maximum in-degree and maximum out-degree are both one.
The second input is an element of the search space that is known to be a source.
The desired output is a bitstring that is either a sink or a different source.
Given a method of computing values of a continuous function from the n-
dimensional unit simplex to itself, the Scarf algorithm follows such a path in a
graph to an approximate fixed point. The algorithms described in subsequent sec-
tions are also based on following paths in graphs. Papadimitriou (1994b) showed
how to display the problem solved by the Scarf algorithm as a member of PPAD
if the function evaluations are performed by a Turing machine that is sufficiently
fast. Iterative search can be used to solve a problem in PPAD, but there is also the
possibility that for certain types of problems there may be algorithms that exploit
additional structure that will be embedded in M. The Lemke-Howson algorithm,
which is based on combinatoric search rather than topology, is a concrete instance
of this possibility.
Recently, culminating a rapid sequence of developments (Goldberg and Pa-
padimitriou (2005); Daskalakis et al. (2005); Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2005);
Chen and Deng (2005a)) Chen and Deng (2005b) have given a polynomial time
reduction from PPAD to 2-Nash, so 2-Nash is PPAD-complete. Especially in
view of the result of Hirsch et al. (1989), it seems extremely unlikely that there is
9a polynomial time algorithm for PPAD, so this finding is regarded as compelling
evidence that there is no polynomial time algorithm for 2-Nash, even if it does not
quite amount to a complete proof.
Proposition 2.3 implies that there is a polynomial time reduction passing be-
tween any two of the following problems.
(i) 2-Nash.
(ii) Finding an I-equilibrium of an imitation game.
(iii) Finding a symmetric equilibrium of a symmetric game.
(iv) Finding a solution of an LCP w + Cz = r, z ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, 〈z,w〉 = 0 with all
entries of C and r positive.
This result complements the work described above: in addition to fully embodying
the complexity of PPAD, to a greater extent than had been known previously 2-
Nash turns out to be a unifying aspect of the computational theory of games and
linear complementarity problems.
4 The Lemke Paths Algorithm
In the remainder we study specific algorithms that have been applied to 2-Nash
and linear complementarity problems. In this section we study the Lemke paths
algorithm in its application to the LCP
w + Cz = r, z ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, 〈z,w〉 = 0,
where C is a p × p matrix and r ∈ Rp. (Except in special settings described later,
we impose no restrictions on the signs of the entries of C and r.) For z ∈ Rp let
w(z) := r − Cz. Let
Z := { z ∈ Rp : z ≥ 0 and w(z) ≥ 0 }.
If Z is nonempty it is a convex polyhedron.
A label is a pair λ = (λz , λw) in which λz and λw are subsets of [1, p]. For z ∈ Z
let ℓ(z) = (ℓz(z), ℓw(z)) where
ℓz(z) := { i = 1, . . . , p : zi > 0 } and ℓw(z) := { j = 1, . . . , p : wj(z) > 0 }.
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For a label λ let
Zλ := { z ∈ Z : ℓ(z) = λ }.
We say that λ is feasible if Zλ is nonempty. If λ is feasible, then Zλ is the relative
interior of a convex polyhedron.
We will only consider nondegenerate problems. Let |λ| := |λz| + |λw| where
the summands are the cardinalities of λz and λw. The pair (C, r) is nondegenerate
if Zλ = ∅ whenever |λ| < p and has the “expected” dimension |λ| − p whenever
it is nonempty. Various techniques are known for extending the Lemke paths and
Lemke-Howson algorithms to degenerate problems. For the most part we expect
the main point made here to extend to those techniques, but we will not consider
the issue explicitly.
A basis is a label β such that |β| = p. If β is feasible, then nondegeneracy
implies that Zβ is a singleton whose unique element will be denoted by zβ, and we
will usually write wβ in place of w(zβ). The basis is complementary if βz∪βw = [1, p]
or, equivalently, βz ∩ βw = ∅. When the LCP given by C and r is nondegenerate
its solutions are precisely the pairs (zβ, wβ) associated with feasible complementary
bases β.
An edge label is a label ε such that |ε| = p+1. If ε is feasible, then Zε is an open
line segment or an open ray (Z does not contain any lines because is contained in
the positive orthant of Rp) and its endpoints are points of the form zβ where β is a
feasible basis obtained by dropping one element of εz or εw.
Fix an ℓ = 1, . . . , p. A basis β is ℓ-almost complementary if βz ∩ βw ⊂ {ℓ}.
Note that if β is complementary, it is ℓ-almost complementary for any ℓ. When β is
ℓ-almost complementary but not complementary there is a missing label h such that
βz ∪ βw = [1, p] \ {h}. An edge label ε is ℓ-almost complementary if εz ∩ εw = {ℓ},
in which case εz ∪ εw = [1, p] because |ε| = p + 1. Let Z
ℓ be the union of the sets
Zε for all ℓ-almost complementary edge labels ε and the sets Zβ for all ℓ-almost
complementary bases β. The Lemke paths algorithm is derived from the geometric
properties of Zℓ.
If ε is an ℓ-almost complementary edge label and β is obtained from ε by drop-
ping one element of εz or εw, then β is ℓ-almost complementary. In particular, β is
feasible and ℓ-almost complementary whenever ε is a feasible ℓ-almost complemen-
tary edge label and zβ is an endpoint of Zε.
Suppose that β is a feasible basis and ε is obtained from β by adding one element,
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say i∗, to βz. Then ε is feasible. In detail, the solution set of the the system of
p− 1 equations that require that zi = 0 if i /∈ εz and wj = 0 if j /∈ εw consists of zβ
and two rays, on one of which zi∗ is positive, and at points on this ray near zβ the
variables zi for i ∈ εz and wj for j ∈ εw are all positive. A similar argument shows
that ε is feasible when it is obtained from β by adding one element to βw.
If β is feasible and complementary, there is precisely one way to obtain an ℓ-
complementary edge label by adding an element to either βz or βw, namely adding
ℓ to whichever set does not already contain it. Therefore zβ is an endpoint of Zε
for precisely one ℓ-almost complementary edge label ε. If β is feasible and ℓ-almost
complementary, but not complementary, then there are precisely two ways to add
an element to βz or βw to obtain an ℓ-almost complementary edge label, namely
adding the missing label to either of these sets. The two edges obtained in this way
are said to be adjacent in Zℓ.
The analysis above yields the following picture of Zℓ. It is a closed subset of Rp
that is the union of finitely many points, open line segments, and open half lines.
It is a one dimensional manifold with boundary that has finitely many connected
components, each of which is homeomorphic to the circle, [0, 1], [0, 1), or (0, 1).
The points zβ for complementary feasible bases β are the boundary points of this
manifold.
The general idea of the Lemke paths algorithm is to begin at either an open half
line in Zℓ or a point zβ associated with a complementary feasible basis. It follows
the connected component of Zℓ containing the starting point, “pivoting” from one
vertex to the next until it arrives at either a boundary point or a half line. The
computation is considered successful if it terminates at some zβ, and termination
at a half line is regarded as failure.
The phrase “Lemke paths algorithm” is a bit imprecise insofar as additional
conditions are required before one has an algorithm in the sense of a well defined
computational procedure that is guaranteed to halt in finite time. Specifically, there
must be a way to find a half line in Zℓ or a complementary feasible basis β. The con-
nected component of Zℓ containing the starting point cannot be homeomorphic to a
circle, so the pivoting procedure beginning there cannot cycle and must eventually
terminate at zβ for some complementary feasible β or at a half line.
As is explained in Lemke (1965) and other sources, a variety of assumptions on
the given data allow one to find starting points of the process for which success
12
is guaranteed. Consider, for example, the possibility that all the entries of C are
negative. Then ε = ({ℓ}, [1, p]) is an ℓ-almost complementary edge label for which
Zε is a ray. Moreover, this is the only ℓ-almost complementary edge label that can be
associated with a ray: if { z0 + αz : α > 0 } is Zε for some ℓ-almost complementary
edge label ε, then z ≥ 0 and z 6= 0, so εw = [1, p] because every component of
Cz is negative. Thus this case provides both easily located starting points and a
guarantee of success. Another such case is when all the entries of C and r are
positive: ([0, p], ∅) is feasible and complementary, hence a starting point of a path
in each Zℓ. Since Z is bounded, the algorithm cannot terminate at a half line.
The numerical implementation of the pivoting procedure of the Lemke paths
algorithm, and related algorithms below, is usually described in terms of updating
a “tableau,” and may be thought of as a matter of using the sorts of pivots involved
in Gaussian elimination to update a coordinate system that, at each step, has as
its coordinates the variables zi for i ∈ βz and wj for j ∈ βw for some ℓ-almost
complementary β, translated to place the origin at zβ. Detailed descriptions of this
numerical procedure can be found in many sources, but our analysis will not refer
to them.
5 Lemke Howson from Lemke Paths
In order to display the Lemke-Howson algorithm as a special case of the Lemke paths
algorithm we now specialize to the case of an LCP in which the matrix has the block
structure that occurs in the application to two person games. Let p = m+n where
m and n are both positive integers, and let A and B be m× n matrices. We study
the LCP[
u
v
]
+
[
0 A
BT 0
][
x
y
]
=
[
p
q
]
, u, v, x, y ≥ 0, u · x = 0, v · y = 0.
For x ∈ Rm and y ∈ Rn let
v(x) := q −BTx ∈ Rn and u(y) := p−Ay ∈ Rm.
Let
Z := { (x, y) ∈ Rm ×Rn : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, u(y) ≥ 0, and v(x) ≥ 0 }.
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Then Z := X × Y where
X := {x ∈ Rm : x ≥ 0 and v(x) ≥ 0 } and Y := { y ∈ Rn : y ≥ 0 and u(y) ≥ 0 }.
Under the identifications r = (p, q), z = (x, y), and w = (u, v) the components
of p, x, and u have indices in [1,m], and the components of s, y, and v have indices
in [m+ 1,m+ n]. A label is now
λ = (λz , λw) =
(
(λx, λy), (λu, λv)
)
where λx, λu ⊂ [1,m] and λy, λv ⊂ [m+ 1,m+ n]. For x ∈ X let
ℓx(x) := { i ∈ [1,m] : xi > 0 } and ℓv(x) := { j ∈ [m+ 1,m+ n] : vj(x) > 0 },
and for y ∈ Y let
ℓy(y) := { j ∈ [m+ 1,m+ n] : yj > 0 } and ℓu(y) := { i ∈ [1,m] : ui(y) > 0 }.
We now have ℓz(x, y) = ℓx(x)∪ ℓy(y) and ℓw(x, y) = ℓu(y)∪ ℓv(x). For a label λ let
Xλ := {x ∈ X : ℓx(x) = λx and ℓv(x) = λv }
and
Yλ := { y ∈ Y : ℓy(y) = λy and ℓu(y) = λu }.
Clearly Zλ = Xλ × Yλ.
If λ is feasible, then linear algebra implies that the dimension of Xλ is at least
|λx|+ |λv| −n and the dimension of Yλ is at least |λy|+ |λu| −m, so nondegeneracy
implies that the dimension of Xλ is exactly |λx|+ |λv | − n and the dimension of Yλ
is exactly |λy|+ |λu| −m. As before, a basis is a label β with
|βx|+ |βy|+ |βu|+ |βv| = m+ n.
If β is feasible, then |βx| + |βv| = n and |βy| + |βu| = m. An edge label ε is an
X-edge label if |εx| + |εv | = n + 1 and |εy| + |εu| = m, and it is a Y -edge label if
|εx| + |εv| = n and |εy| + |εu| = m + 1. When ε is feasible one of these two cases
holds, and we say that Zε is either an X-edge or a Y -edge as the case may be.
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Suppose that β is a feasible basis that is ℓ-almost complementary but not com-
plementary, and let h be the missing label of β. If 1 ≤ h ≤ m then the ℓ-almost
complementary edge label obtained by adding h to βx is an X-edge label and the
ℓ-almost complementary edge label obtained by adding h to βu is a Y -edge label. If
m+1 ≤ h ≤ m+n then the ℓ-almost complementary edge label obtained by adding
h to βv is an X-edge label and the ℓ-almost complementary edge label obtained by
adding h to βy is a Y -edge label. In either case, of the two edges in Z
ℓ that have zβ
as an endpoint, one is an X-edge and the other is a Y -edge, so that we may think of
any path in Zℓ as an alternation between moves in X and moves in Y . But without
further assumptions the projections of a path in Zℓ onto X and Y need not be one
dimensional manifolds.
The derivation of the Lemke-Howson algorithm per se is as follows. Suppose that
all the entries of A andB are positive, and that p = em and q = en. Then z = 0 ∈ Rp
is complementary, but does not correspond to a Nash equilibrium. For any ℓ there
is a path in Zℓ starting at 0 that leads to zβℓ for some feasible complementary basis
βℓ. Necessarily zβℓ 6= 0, and complementarity, together with the block structure of
C, imply that xβℓ 6= 0 and yβℓ 6= 0, so that rescaling these vectors by dividing by the
sum of components gives a Nash equilibrium. If more than one equilibrium is sought
then, in addition to finding each zβℓ , one can follow the paths in Z
ℓ′ beginning at
zβℓ when ℓ
′ 6= ℓ, then continue in this fashion recursively at any new equilibria that
are found. Wilson gave an example (reported in Shapley (1974)) of a game with
equilibria that are inaccessible in the sense that this procedure does not find them.
6 From Lemke-Howson to Lemke Paths
For the most part the material in the last two section has been well known since
Lemke (1965). We now present this paper’s contribution to the understanding of
these algorithms, which is a derivation of the Lemke paths, in a special case of the
framework above, as projections of the Lemke-Howson paths onto Y .
Continuing with the setup of the last section, we now specialize further, assuming
that n = m, that B = I is the m ×m identity matrix, and that q = em. We now
have X = [0, 1]m. Let ρ : [m+ 1, 2m] → [1,m] be the map ρ(j) := j −m. For any
label λ, Xλ 6= ∅ if and only if
λx ∪ ρ(λv) = [1,m]. (∗)
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A Y -label is a pair µ = (µy, µu) where µy ⊂ [m + 1, 2m] and µu ⊂ [1,m]. For
such a label let
Yµ := { y ∈ Y : ℓy(y) = µy and ℓu(y) = µu }.
If Yµ is nonempty we way that µ is feasible. For a label λ let π(λ) := (λy, λu) be
the derived Y -label. Then Yπ(λ) = Yλ, and |βx|+ |βv | = m = |βy|+ |βu| when β is
a feasible basis, so:
Lemma 6.1. A label λ is feasible if and only if π(λ) is feasible and (∗) holds. In
particular, if |λx|+ |λv| = m (as is the case when β is a feasible basis) then
ρ(λv) = [1,m] \ λx. (∗∗)
A Y -basis is a Y -label α with |αy|+ |αu| = m. A Y -basis α is Y -complementary
if ρ(αy)∪αu = [1,m]. If β is a feasible basis, then π(β) is feasible and ρ(βv) = [1,m]\
βx, and if β is also complementary, then βu = [1,m] \ βx and ρ(βv) = [1,m] \ ρ(βy),
so that βu = [1,m] \ ρ(βy), i.e., π(β) is complementary. Thus:
Lemma 6.2. If a basis β is feasible and complementary, then π(β) is feasible and
complementary.
Conversely:
Lemma 6.3. If α is a complementary Y -basis, then
β :=
(
(ρ(αy), αy), (αu, ρ
−1(αu))
)
is the unique complementary basis with π(β) = α, and α is feasible, then so is β.
Proof. Suppose that β is a basis such that π(β) = α, i.e., βy = αy and βu = αu.
If β is complementary, then βx = [1,m] \ αu and βv = [m + 1, 2m] \ αy, and since
α is complementary it follows that βx = [1,m] \ ρ(βv). That is, (∗) holds, so β is
feasible is α is.
An edge Y -label (not to be confused with a Y -edge label) is a Y -label δ with
|δy | + |δu| = m + 1. Fix an integer ℓ ∈ [1,m]. An edge Y -label δ is ℓ-almost
complementary if ρ(δy) ∩ δu = {ℓ}, in which case ρ(δy) ∪ δu = [1,m].
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Lemma 6.4. If a Y -edge label ε is feasible and ℓ-almost complementary or (ℓ +
m)-almost complementary, then the edge Y -label π(ε) is ℓ-almost complementary.
Conversely, if δ is a feasible ℓ-almost complementary edge Y -label, then there is
exactly one feasible ℓ-almost complementary Y -edge label ε such that π(ε) = δ and
exactly one feasible (ℓ+m)-almost complementary Y -edge label ε′ such that π(ε′) =
δ.
Proof. Let ε be a feasible Y -edge label. If ε is ℓ-almost complementary, then
ρ(εy) = ρ([m+ 1, 2m] \ εv) = [1,m] \ ρ(εv) = εx = ([1,m] \ εu) ∪ {ℓ},
(the third equality is (∗∗)) so π(ε) is ℓ-almost complementary. If ε is (ℓ+m)-almost
complementary, then
ρ(εy) = ρ([m+ 1, 2m] \ εv ∪ {ℓ+m}) = [1,m] \ ρ(εv) ∪ {ℓ}
= εx ∪ {ℓ} = ([1,m] \ εu) ∪ {ℓ},
so π(ε) is ℓ-almost complementary.
Suppose that δ is a feasible ℓ-almost complementary edge Y -label and ε is a
feasible Y -edge label with π(ε) = δ. If ε ℓ-almost complementary, then εv = [m+
1, 2m] \ δy, because ε is ℓ-almost complementary, and feasibility implies that εx =
[1,m] \ ρ(εv) = ρ(δy). It is easy to see that
(
(ρ(δy), δy), (δu, [m + 1, 2m] \ δy)
)
is, in fact, ℓ-almost complementary. If ε is (ℓ + m)-almost complementary, then
εx = [1,m] \ δu, because ε is (ℓ+m)-almost complementary, and feasibility implies
that εv = [m + 1, 2m] \ ρ
−1(εx) = ρ
−1(δu). Clearly
(
([1,m] \ δu, δy), (δu, ρ
−1(δu))
)
is, in fact, ℓ-almost complementary.
A Y -basis α is ℓ-almost complementary if ρ(αy) ∩ αu ⊂ {ℓ}.
Lemma 6.5. If a basis β is feasible and ℓ-almost complementary or (ℓ+m)-almost
complementary, then π(β) is ℓ-almost complementary.
Proof. Above we saw that π(β) is complementary if β is complementary, so suppose
otherwise, and let h be the missing label: βz∪βw = [1, 2m]\{h}. There are four cases
according to whether β is ℓ-almost complementary or (ℓ+m)-almost complementary
and whether 1 ≤ h ≤ m or m+ 1 ≤ h ≤ 2m.
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First, suppose that β is ℓ-almost complementary. If 1 ≤ h ≤ m, then
ρ(βy) = ρ([m+ 1, 2m] \ βv) = [1,m] \ ρ(βv) = βx = ([1,m] \ βu) ∪ {ℓ} \ {h}.
If m+ 1 ≤ h ≤ 2m, then
ρ(βy) = ρ([m+ 1, 2m] \ (βv ∪ {h})) = [1,m] \ (ρ(βv) ∪ {h−m})
= βx \ {h−m} = ([1,m] \ βu) ∪ {ℓ} \ {h−m}.
Now suppose β is (ℓ+m)-almost complementary. If 1 ≤ h ≤ m, then
ρ(βy) = ρ([m+ 1, 2m] \ βv ∪ {ℓ+m}) = [1,m] \ ρ(βv) ∪ {ℓ}
= βx ∪ {ℓ} = ([1,m] \ βu) ∪ {ℓ} \ {h},
and if m+ 1 ≤ h ≤ 2m, then
ρ(βy) = ρ([m+ 1, 2m] \ βv ∪ {ℓ+m} \ {h}) = ([1,m] \ ρ(βv)) ∪ {ℓ} \ {h−m})
= βx ∪ {ℓ} \ {h−m} = ([1,m] \ βu) ∪ {ℓ} \ {h−m}.
In all four cases π(β) is ℓ-almost complementary.
We now analyze the preimages of a feasible ℓ-almost complementary Y -basis.
There are two cases, according to whether α is complementary.
Lemma 6.6. Let α be a complementary feasible Y -basis, and let
β :=
(
(ρ(αy), αy), (αu, ρ
−1(αu))
)
.
If ℓ /∈ αu, then there is no other feasible ℓ-almost complementary basis β
′ with
π(β′) = α, and when ℓ ∈ αu there is exactly one such β
′, and zβ and zβ′ are the
endpoints of a feasible ℓ-almost complementary X-edge. If ℓ+m /∈ αy, then there is
no other feasible (ℓ+m)-almost complementary basis β′ with π(β′) = α, and when
ℓ+m ∈ αu there is exactly one such β
′, in which case zβ and zβ′ are the endpoints
of a feasible (ℓ+m)-almost complementary X-edge.
Proof. Let β′ be a feasible basis that is not complementary with π(β′) = α.
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Suppose that β′ is ℓ-almost complementary with β′z ∩ β
′
w = {ℓ} and β
′
z ∪ β
′
w =
[1, 2m] \ {h}. Then ℓ ∈ β′u = αu, so ℓ +m /∈ αy = β
′
y, and ℓ ∈ β
′
x = [1,m] \ ρ(β
′
v),
so ℓ+m /∈ β′v, which means that h = ℓ+m. That is, when ℓ ∈ αu it must be the
case that
β′ =
(
(ρ(αy) ∪ {ℓ}, αy), (αu, ρ
−1(αu \ {ℓ}))
)
.
Note that
(
(ρ(αy) ∪ {ℓ}, αy), (αu, ρ
−1(αu))
)
is a feasible ℓ-almost complementary
X-edge label.
Now suppose that β′ is (ℓ+m)-almost complementary, with β′z ∩ β
′
w = {ℓ+m}
and β′z∪β
′
w = [1, 2m]\{h} for some h. Then ℓ+m ∈ αy, so ℓ /∈ αu, and ℓ+m ∈ αv,
so that ℓ /∈ β′x = [1,m] \ ρ(β
′
v), which means that h = ℓ. That is, when ℓ+m ∈ αy
we have
β′ =
(
(ρ(αy) \ {ℓ}, αy), (αu, ρ
−1(αu ∪ {ℓ}))
)
.
In this case
(
(ρ(αy), αy), (αu, ρ
−1(αu ∪ {ℓ}))
)
is a feasible (ℓ +m)-almost comple-
mentary X-edge label.
Lemma 6.7. Suppose that α is a feasible Y -basis that is ℓ-almost complementary,
but not complementary, with ρ(αy)∪αu = [1,m]\{h}. Then there are precisely two
ℓ-almost complementary bases that project to α, say β and β′, and zβ and zβ′ are
the endpoints of a feasible ℓ-almost complementary X-edge. There are also precisely
two (ℓ + m)-almost complementary bases that project to α, say β and β′, and zβ
and zβ′ are the endpoints of a feasible (ℓ+m)-almost complementary X-edge.
Proof. Let β be a feasible basis with π(β) = α. Since π(β) is not complementary,
β cannot be complementary.
First suppose that β is ℓ-almost complementary. Since ∅ = βy ∩ βv = αy ∩ βv,
we have ρ(αy) ∩ ([1,m] \ βx) = ∅, i.e., ρ(αy) ⊂ βx. In addition, αu = βu, so
βx ⊂ ([1,m] \ αu) ∪ {ℓ} = ρ(αy) ∪ {h}. Thus the only possibilities for β are
(
(ρ(αy), αy), (αu, [m+ 1, 2m] \ αy)
)
and (
(ρ(αy) ∪ {h}, αy), (αu, [m+ 1, 2m] \ (αy ∪ {h+m}))
)
,
and in fact both are feasible and ℓ-almost complementary. Note that
(
(ρ(αy) ∪ {h}, αy), (αu, [m+ 1, 2m] \ αy)
)
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is a feasible ℓ-almost complementary X-edge label.
Now assume that β is (ℓ +m)-almost complementary. We have ∅ = αu ∩ βx =
αu ∩ ([1,m] \ ρ(βv)), so ρ
−1(αu) ⊂ βv . In addition, αy = ρ
−1([1,m] \αu ∪{ℓ} \ {h})
and βy = αy, so
βv ⊂ [m+ 1, 2m] \ αy ∪ {ℓ+m} = ρ
−1(αu) ∪ {h+m}.
Therefore it is only possible that β is either
(
([1,m] \ αu, αy), (αu, ρ
−1(αu))
)
or (
([1,m] \ (αu ∪ {h}), αy), (αu, ρ
−1(αu ∪ {h}))
)
,
and in fact both are feasible and (ℓ+m)-almost complementary. Note that
(
([1,m] \ αu, αy), (αu, ρ
−1(αu ∪ {h}))
)
is a feasible (ℓ+m)-almost complementary X-edge label.
Let Y ℓ be the union of the sets Yδ for all ℓ-almost complementary edge Y -labels
δ and the sets Yα for all ℓ-almost complementary bases α. Of course these are just
the concepts introduced in Section 4, now applied to the LCP
u+Ay = p, y ≥ 0, u ≥ 0, 〈y, u〉 = 0,
with the added twist that the components of y are indexed by the elements of
[m+ 1, 2m]. All the results from that section apply.
The results above combine to give a simple picture of the relationship between
Y ℓ, Zℓ, and Zℓ+m. Let πY : Z → Y be the projection πY (x, y) := y, and for each
k = 1, . . . , 2m let πkY be the restriction of πY to Z
k. Then πℓY maps Z
ℓ surjectively
onto Y ℓ, and πℓ+mY maps Z
ℓ+m surjectively onto Y ℓ. Since X is bounded, any
X-edge in Zℓ or Zℓ+m is bounded and has compact closure, and each such closed
X-edge is mapped to a single point that has the closed X-edge as its preimage.
Outside of these X-edges πℓY and π
ℓ+m
Y are injective. Except for the compressions
of X-edges, πℓY and π
ℓ+m
Y are “topologically faithful”: the topology of Y
ℓ is the
quotient topology induced by each of these maps, and the preimage under πℓY (π
ℓ+m
Y )
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of a connected component of Y ℓ is a single connected component of Zℓ (Zℓ+m) that
is homeomorphic to it. In particular, any Lemke-Howson path in Zℓ or in Zℓ+m
projects onto a Lemke path in Y ℓ with half as many steps, after allowance for “off
by one” adjustments at the endpoints, and any Lemke path in Y ℓ has well defined
“lifts” to Lemke-Howson paths in Zℓ and Zℓ+m.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the solutions of several problems are in one-to-one correspon-
dence. This implies that the computational problem of finding a solution of one
of these problems is the same as the problem of finding a solution to any other.
That is, these problems are all avatars of 2-Nash. We have also shown that the
Lemke-Howson algorithm for 2-Nash and the Lemke paths algorithm for LCP’s are
essentially the same, thereby achieving a unified understanding of their exponential
worst case complexity.
In linear programming worst case complexity presents a relatively coarse and
somewhat misleading view of the subject: although the simplex algorithm has ex-
ponential worst case complexity, various investigations of its mean time complexity
show it to be quite fast. The results described in Section 3 show that from the
point of view of worst case complexity, any problem in PPAD is equivalent to
2-Nash, but it may still be the case that different problems have very different de-
grees of difficulty in practice. The Lemke-Howson algorithm routinely solves two
person games with hundreds of pure strategies, and recently Porter et al. (2004)
and Sun et al. (2006) have presented experimental evidence suggesting that simple
search methods can result in faster mean performance. We hope that a deeper
understanding of the complexity of 2-Nash will emerge from analysis of the mean
time complexity of Lemke-Howson, and perhaps other algorithms, for natural and
tractable distributions on the space of games.
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